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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ACTS
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have had
twenty-five annual conferences.
The principal fruit of
their labors is represented by the Negotiable Instruments
Act, enacted in forty-seven jurisdictions; the Warehouse
Receipts Act, enacted in thirty-one jurisdictions; the Sales
Act, enacted in fourteen jurisdictions, the Bills of Lading
Act enacted in thirteen jurisdictions, and the Stock Transfer Act, enacted in nine jurisdictions.
They have also
drafted acts relating to divorce, family desertion, probate
of wills, marriage evasion, workmen's compensation and
partnership but these have not yet been enacted in more
than a few states. All of the commercial acts are law in
Pennsylvania. The Negotiable Instruments Act may be
found in the Acts of 1901, p. 194; the Warehouse Receipts
Act in the Acts of 1909, p. 19; the Bills of Lading Act in
the Acts of 1911, p. 838; the Stock Transfer Act in the
Acts of 1911, p. 126; and the Sales Act in the Acts of 1915,
p. 543.
The primary purpose of these acts is to secure uniformity in the laws of the different states, but a secondary purpose in the adoption of the Warehouse Receipts
Act, the Bills of Lading Act and the Stock Transfer Act
w'as to increase the negotiability of these instruments and
reduce to the minimum the risks run by a purchaser, that
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they might be used with greater facility to secure credit
from bankers. These three acts and the Sales Act all contain many provisions relating to the same questions, but
unfortunately and without apparent reason the answers
given by the different acts are frequently different. Section 78 of the Sales Act provides that it shall not be construed to repeal any of the provisions of the Warehouse
Receipts Act or the Bills of Lading Act.
It has been
found that this situation is productive of confusion in the
minds of students of these acts and to avoid this it is necessary that the points of difference in the provisions relating to the same subject matter be made as conspicuous
as possible. It is a pity that no publication is available
in which the corresponding sections of the commercial acts
are placed in juxtaposition, as this would ,greatly facilitate comparison.
It is the aim of this article to point out these differences
in the acts and to explain the risks that a purchaser of
documents of title still runs. Incidentally the entire Bills
of Lading Act, Warehouse Receipts Act and Stock Transfer Act will be reviewed and those provisions of the Sales
Act relating to documents of title. The Negotiable Instruments Act is not included in this discussion.
L

Two Classes of Documents

Prior to these acts, documents of title were not dependent upon their form for such degree of negotiability
as they possessed.
The new acts divide documents into
two classes according to their form. "Order" and "bearer" documents are negotiable. "Straight" documents, i. e.
where the goods are deliverable only to the person named
therein, are not negotiable. The Bills of Lading Act requires the words "to the order of" to precede the name ot
the consignee. In the Warehouse Receipts Act, the words
"or order" follow the name of him to whom -the goods are
deliverable. Receipts nmay also run "to bearer."
All
certificates of stock are negotiable.
Under the acts -the
rights of a holder of a negotiable document re fixed by
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the terms of the document, free from any equities the
bailee or prior owners may have. The contract of the
carrier was not assignable at common law, but the bill of
lading was held to represent the goods, so that delivery of
it was counted delivery of the goods. Under the acts both
the contract and the ownership are transferable, and the
law is assimilated to that of bills and notes.
Prior Legislation in Pennsylvania
The Act of Sept. 24, 1866, P. L. 1363, made all bills
of lading and warehouse receipts negotiable, if not marked
non-negotiable, and required their surrender before delivery of the goods. It was made criminal to issue a receipt
without having received the goods; to issue a duplicate not
so marked; to sell or ship goods held by a warehouseman
before surrender of the receipt.
The Act of June 13, 1874, P. L. 285, protects holders
of negotiable documents against attachments, etc.
The
A.ct of May 25, 1893, P. L. 133, provided a remedy in case
of the loss or destruction of a document.
Construction of Act of 1866
In Shaw v. R. R., 101 U. S. 557, it was held that the
Act of '66 did not make these documents as negotiable as
bills of exchange and promissory notes but merely entitled
the holder to enforce the contract in .his own name. The
Effect of this early legislation is fully reviewed in Bank v.
Shearer, 225 Pa. 470, and Bank v. Hartzell Co., 55 Pa.
Super. 56. The Act of 1866 was important only in that it
precluded the bailee from setting up against a purchaser
of a document a secret agreement made with the depositor, which would create an incumbrance or condition upon
the rights of such purchaser.
Permissible Provisions in Documents
The essential provisions of all bills and receipts are
soecified in Sec. 2 of each act. But there is no liability
for a .!failure to insert any of these provisions except in the
case of negotiable documents, in which case the liability is
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"for all damage caused by the omission." The only pro,v.sion specifically prohibited is one seeking to provide
against liability for negligence.
A warehouseman may
insert any other provision not "contrary to the provisions
of the act." But a carrier may not insert any provision
"contrary to law or public policy."
Duplicate Documents
To issue a duplicate negotiable document not marked
duplicate imposes liability in damages to one who buys it
as an original.
Marking Documents
To omit to mark a straight receipt "not negotiable"
imposes on the warehouseman the same liabilities to a
purchaser supposing it negotiable, as would have been imposed had the receipt been negotiable. There is no criminal liability. The rule is reversed as to bills of lading. No
civil liability is provided for, but if intent to defraud exists, the omission is a crime. (Sec. 50).
The negotiability of a document drawn to "order"
is not impaired by its being marked "not negotiable." It
is folly, therefore, to rely on the presence or absence of
these words. The omission of these words, in the case of
a straight receipt, does not create a liability on the part of
the warehouseman which fully protects the holder. The
warehouseman would be liable for making a delivery to the
depositor or -anyone other than the holder of a non-negotiable receipt not so marked but he is not made liable if
creditors of the depositor levy on the goods. He incurs
the same liabilities as if the receipt had been negotiable
but he is not made a guarantor of its negotiability, nor is
the receipt treated as negotiable as between the holder ane
third parties. These acts assure a recovery if the document turns out to 'be a duplicate, if the person issuing it
is financially responsible, but one must still rely on his
own reading of the body of the document to determine
whether or not it is negotiable. Why should not full lia.
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bility be imposed for the wrongful omission of the words
non-negotiable, as for the omission of the word "duplicate"; or else why not cease to require the insertion of the
words at all?
Assent to Terms
The disputed question, as to when -the acceptance of
a document without objection to its terms is to be taken as
assent to its lawful terms, is settled in the affirmative by
the act relating to bills of lading but it is not covered by
the Warehouse Receipts Act. ('Sec. 10 of Bills of Lading
Act). See Healy v. R. R. Co., 138 N. Y. S. 287.
Excuses for Non-Delivery
These two acts differ again in the sections defining
The
the lawful excuses for the non-delivery of goods.
warehouseman must find his excuse in the provisions of
the act, such as a failure to satisfy his lien, surrender negotiable receipts and sign an acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods. Carriers on the other hand may offer
"any lawful excuse," and what these are is left to judicial
determination.
Delivery to Agent
Again, while both warehouseman and carrier may
deliver to an agent of the consignee, the warehouseman
is justified in delivering only when the agent exhibits
written authority. Any authority, verbal or written, and
probably even an apparent authority, will justify delivery
by a carrier. So also a carrier may justify delivery when
"compelled by legal process," while the language of the
Warehouse Receipts Act seems to exclude this as a justification, unless the warehouseman can show that the real
owner 'got the goods. (Compare Secs. 14 and 22 of Bills
of Lading Act with Secs. 12 and 19 of Warehouse Receipts
Act. See Klein v. Patterson, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 495.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Alterations
It is a pity that the provision as to the effect of an
alteration of a bill of lading is not found in the Warehouse
Receipts Act.
Alterations to bills of lading must be authorized by the carrier in writing or the alteration is void
but the bill remains enforceable according to its original
tenor. One verbally authorized may justify altering a receipt, but if the authority is not proven and -the alteration
is material and fraudulent, the receipt is rendered void as
to the one who made the alteration or who took with notice of it. An innocent holder may enforce its original
provisions and in all cases the goods may be recovered by
one entitled to them. The forfeiture extends only to contract obligations and not to the goods. There is no for.
feiture at all resulting from the alteration of a bill af lading and this seems the better rule. A certificate of stock
is the owner's muniment of title under the Transfer of
Stock Act. It is not a contract.
That act accordingly
provides that even fraudulent alteration shall not work a
forfeiture. The alteration only is void.
Lost Documents
In the matter of lost or destroyed documents we tind
different provisions. Sec. 54 of the Warehouse Receipts
Act makes it a criminal offense to deliver goods while a
negotiable receipt is known to be outstanding. To avoid
this liability, in case a receipt is lost or destroyed, the
warehouseman must require an order of court, after proof
of the loss, and the depositor must give bond to protect
anyone injured by the delivery of the goods. It is not a
criminal offense to issue a second stock certificate or bill
of lading upon the loss of the original. Accordingly, there
is nothing to prevent the corporation and the carrier respectively from making such arrangements as they deem
satisfactory, with the holder of a lost or destroyed certificate or bill of lading, without any legal proceedings. Under
all the acts legal proceedings may be required by the one
issuing the document and the proceedings are the same
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except -that in the case of lost or destroyed stock certificates, the act requires "reasonable notice by publication,
and in any other way which the court may direct, to all
persons interested." If this is important in the case of
certificates, why is it not required in the case of receipts
and bills of lading? Again, if it is proper to make the
legal proceeding optional in the case of stock certificates
and bills of lading, why should it not be optional in the
case of warehouse receipts?
Use of Duplicates
Bills and receipts marked "duplicate" are useful only
as proof -that there was an original properly issued, of
which the duplicate is an accurate copy. Duplicate stock
certificates are not issued. The Warehouse Receipts Act
further provides that a warranty is implied that the original was uncancelled at -the date of the issue of the duplicate. One buying goods represented by a bill of lading
alleged to be lost or destroyed should be enabled to make
sure that at least the bill has not been cancelled and to secure written proof of this, but no similar provision appears
in the Bills of Lading Act.
Bailee Claiming Title
As to the right of one issuing a document to set up
title in himself we find a difference in the acts. The title
which may be set up by the warehouseman must have been
acquired from the depositor. A carrier may acquire title
from either consignor or consignee. Surely a warehouseman may acquire title from one named in the receipt by
the depositor's direction as the one to whom the goods are
deliverable. And surely he may acquire title from one to
whom a negotiable bill or receipt has been negotiated, or
from the transferee of a straight bill or receipt. It was
probably intended merely to provide that one who has issued a document is estopped to claim a paramount title to
the goods represented by it and this is no doubt the effect
of the provisions of the acts.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Secret Liens
A corporation may not claim a lien on its own shares
unless the right to such lien is stated upon the certificate.
The purchaser of a straight receipt or bill is always liable
to find a lien on the goods for various charges or advances.
But the purchaser of a negotiable bill or receipt is protected against such claims in part. He must always read a
bill of lading to see if it enumerates special charges for
which a lien is claimed, for unless in violation of the terms
of the contract, or illegal, a lien for such enumerated charges is enforceable against any holder. The Warehouse Receipts Act makes it necessary -for the
warehouseman to state the amount of such enumerated charges. The Bills of Lading Act is silent on this point. What
special charges may be the subject of a lien when enumerated in a receipt are expressly stated in the Warehouse Receipt Act, in Sec. 27. The Bills of Lading Act requires only
that they be not illegal or in conflict with the contract. In
case the document enumerates no special charges, the purchaser of a negotiable receipt may only be met by a lien for
storage since the date of the receipt. In a like case the
purchaser of a negotiable bill of lading may have to discharge a lien for any "freight, storage, demurrage and terminal charges, and expenses necessary for the preservation
of the goods or incident to their transportation subsequent
to the date of the bill."
Accommodation Bills and Receipts
A seller of goods sometimes succeeds in inducing a
freight agent to issue to him a bill of lading for goods which
he -promises to ship the next day. The shipper uses the bill
to get the money from a bank with which to buy goods he is
to ship. If he fails to ship the goods, what are the rights
of the holder against the railroad and against the party from
whom the bill was purchased?
Similarly, fictitious bills,
warehouse receipts or stock certificates are sometimes issued fraudulently by the agents entrusted with this duty, as
a means of raising money. Such documents are genuine
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but they have no goods behind them and in the case of stock
certificates they often result in the issue of stock certificates exceeding the authorized capital of the corporation.
The courts are not agreed as to the liability of the principal
The
for the unauthorized act of its agent in these cases.
Stock Transfer Act is silent on the subject. Under Sec. 20
of the Warehouse Receipts Act, the warehouseman is made
liable for any damage caused the holder of a receipt by
No distinction is made
the non-existence of the goods.
But the
between accommodation and fictitious receipts.
question remains as to whether the fraud of an agent of the
.warehouseman committed for his own benefit is to be regarded as the act of the warehouseman. It has been held
in England and by the Supreme Court of the United States
that a carrier is not liable for the fraudulent issue of ficti.
tious bills of lading for his own benefit. The Bills of Lading Act is clear on the subject and reverses the rule. If the
agent was one having real or apparent authority to issue
bills of lading, the carrier is liable to the holder even upon
bills fraudulently issued by the agent for his own benefit.
It is a pity that the Stock Transfer Act and the Warehouse
Receipts Act are silent on this important question. This is
one of the most serious risks incurred by the purchaser of
a document of title, for the party acting in collusion with
the agent is usually not financially responsible and a seller
of such a document does not warrant its validity or worth
but only his ignorance of facts impairing its validity or
worth. Even in the case of bills of lading there is still this
risk as to bills originating in states which have not yet passed the uniform act.
A similar risk arises when the goods behind the bill
are not of the quantity, quality or kind that the bill of lading specifies. The boxes may be empty or filled with sawdust, etc. The same result is reached as in the preceding
section, if the document specifies the contents of the packages. But the purchaser must read his document carefully, for if it merely states the marks on the packages, or
what they are "said to" contain, or states that the contents
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are unknown, or if a bill of lading is marked "shipper's load
and count," such statements, "if true," exempt the corpora..
tion issuing the document from liability. But since such
statements would not be true when the agent is in collusion
with the shipper, a carrier would be liable to one who has
given value in good faith relying upon the description. The
risks described exist regardless of the negotiable or non-negotiable character of the document, since the defect is not
one of title to the document but is one inherent in the document itself.
Creditors' Remedies and Recission of Transfers
The Warehouse Receipts Act, (Secs. 25 and 26), the
Bills of Lading Act, (Secs. 24 and 25), the Transfer of Stock
Act, (Secs. 13 and 14) and the Sales Act, (Secs. 39 and 40),
all provide that there may be no attachment or levy upon
shares of stock for which a certificate is outstanding or upon goods -for which a negotiable document is outstanding,
until the certificate or document 'be actually seized by the
officer, or surrendered to -the corporation which issued it,
or its negotiation be enjoined.1
This is an important advance upon the common law rule but injunctions are not
always obeyed and a purchaser of a certificate or document
still runs the risk that the negotiation may be void because
in violation of an injunction, of which he had no knowledge.
Those who drafted the acts thought it too extreme a position to take to forbid any attachment, garnishment or levy
on property for which a negotiable document is outstandingj
but nothing short of such a provision gives complete pro.
tection to a purchaser., Secs. 7 and 8 of the Transfer of
Stock Act provides that in case the indorsement or delivery
of a stock certificate was procured by fraud, duress, or made
by mistake or by one without authority from the owner or
after the owner's death or legal incapacity, it may be reclaimed and its transfer rescinded while in the hands of the
'Compare the provisions of the Act of June 13, 1874, P. L. 285;
and Roudebush v. Hollis et al, 21 Pa. C. C. Rep. 324.
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transferee or one who had notice of the defect in title or
who gave no value. Recission is accomplished by impounding or by injunction against further transfer.
But it is
expressly provided that one in possession of the certificate
may make a valid transfer to an innocent purchaser even
though such transfer has been prohibited by injunction. An
injunction in aid of rescission is thus given less effect than
an injunction in aid of creditors. The effect of an injunction in aid of the rescission of the negotiation of a warehouse receipt or bill of lading is not stated in any of the acts
and presumably the negotiation would be void. Surely these
acts fall short of accomplishing their full purpose when they
omit to provide that in no case shall an injunction impair
the validity of the negotiation of a negotiable document to an innocent purchaser for value.
It
should be added that while a levy upon shares of stock becomes valid from the moment the certificate is seized by the
officer, a levy on goods represented by a negotiable document only takes effect from the time the document is surrendered to the bailee. The Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, in their report of Aug. 21, 1908, state that this
provision in reference to attachments and executions "is peculiarly important in the case of negotiable bills of lading,
because negotiable bills of lading are dealt in a long distance from the physical location of the commodity and
where the purchaser or bank advancing money thereon has
no opportunity of making inquiry as to the existence of attachment or executions.
The provision was more frequently, lengthily, thoroughly and exhaustively discussed
than any other section of any uniform act ever discussed
before the Commissioners. Action upon the Sales Act was
finally postponed for a whole year for the sole purpose of
obtaining the views of the country generally upon that section. After a delay of a whole year the section as it now
stands was finally adopted by the unanimous vote of all
states represented in the conference, with but one state declining to vote." It was evidently thought that it would
jeopardize the general enactment of these acts to carry the
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mercantile theory to its logical conclusion -and forbid any attachment while a negotiable document is outstanding. The
risk of injunctions is therefore one which purchasers still
run except in the single case of injunctions in aid of the rescission of transfers of stock.
Destruction of the Goods
Goods may be deposited or shipped 'by one who owns
them and the document may give a correct description of
their kind and quantity but the goods may deterioriate or
;be destroyed while in the hands of the bailee. Whether the
bailee is responsible for the particular kind of loss will da(See Sees. 21 to 24 of Warepend upon circumstances.
house Receipts Act). Insurance would protect against loss
by fire but the risk of deterioriation or destruction by othei
causes is one that cannot be avoided and the likelihood of
deterioriation of perishable goods is such that documents
representing them should be avoided as security for loans.
Spent Documents
Again, the value of a negotiable document of title may
be impaired by the surrender of the goods prior to the surrender of the document. Fraudulent transfer agents sometimes pocket certificates of stock surrendered that new ones
may be issued. These spent bills of lading and receipts and
uncancelled certificates get into the hands of innocent purchasers. Are they protected? There is nothing about the
documents to warn a purchaser, unless it be the date on a
bill of lading, which, if old, would suggest a doubt, first, as
to whether the goods may not have been delivered and second, as to whether they may not have been sold to satisfy
the bailee's lien. Again, bills -and receipts may be partially
spent, as where some of the goods are given up and no indorsement made on the document. Sees. 11 and 12 of the
Warehouse Receipts Act and Sees. 14 and 15 of the Bills of
Lading Act impose liability on the bailee to the innocent
purchaser in such cases but the disputed question of liability in case an agent commits the fraud for his own benefit
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in

either

act
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The Sales Act

contains no relevant provisions.
Again, the document may have been issued to one who stole the goods
and the bailee have been compelled to surrender them to the
owner' or they may have been taken in execution in a state
which has not passed the uniform acts and as the bailee can
justify the surrender in such cases, the purchaser runs this
risk. The Transfer of Stock Act contains no provision defining the rights of a purchaser of an uncancelled certificate wrongfully reissued by the transfer agent, and it is a
pity it does not.
The Method of the Negotiation and Transfer of Documents
of Title
The Sales Act defines a negotiable document of title as
one "in which it is stated that the goods referred to therein
will be delivered to the bearer, or to the order of any person named in such document."
The Warehouse Receipts
Act provides for receipts in either form, to order or to bearer. The Bills of Lading Act provides only for order bills.
Documents running to bearer or in case of those running
to order, when indorsed in blank, are negotiable by delivery.2
The Sales Act and the Warehouse Receipts Act further provide that any holder of a document, in form to be negotiated
by delivery, may convert it into a document negotiable only
by indorsement. He does this by indorsing it to himself
or to any other specified person. This is what is known as
special indorsement.
(See Sec. 34 of the Negotiable Instruments Act). The Bills of Lading Act contains no such
provision and the Sales Act must be read in the light of it.
All the acts provide that one whose indorsement is necessary to the negotiation of the document may indorse it specially, i. e. to a specified person, or in blank, or in the case
'See Estey Co. v. Dick, 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 610.
2
Under the Act of 1866, endorsement was never essential to negotiation. National Union Bank v. Shearer, 225 Pa. 470, 475, 481;
Sloan v. Johnson, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 643.
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of a receipt, to bearer. Certificates of stock may be transferred by delivery when indorsed and the indorsement may
be in blank or to a specified person. (Sees. 1 and 21). Unlike receipts and bills, the transfer may be made by a separate document containing a written assignment or power
of attorney to transfer.
Provisions in the charter of thc
corporation, the by-laws or the certificate itself requiring
further formalities are of no effect since this act.
When a straight bill or receipt is delivered to a purchaser or donee or such delivery is made of a document
which could have been negotiated by indorsement but such
indorsement is omitted, this is called a "transfer" of the
document, by way of distinction from the negotiation of a
negotiable document. The word "transfer" is always used
in referring to certificates of stock but in that use it means
negotiation. Acts falling short of a proper transfer of a
certificate are referred to as an "attempted transfer" or a
"delivery." (See Sees. 9 and 10 of the Act.) All four
acts provide that the omission of an indorsement necessary
to a proper negotiation of a document may be remedied by
the purchaser with the aid of a court of equity but the negotiation takes effect only as of the time when the indorsement ,is actually secured.
(Se. 85, Sales Act; Sec. 9,
Transfer of Stock Act; Sec. 43 of Warehouse Receipts Act,
and Sec. 34 of Bills of Lading Act.) The definition of the
transfer of a document of title is the same in the Sales Act
and in the Warehouse Receipts Act. It is delivery to a
purchaser or donee of a document not in such form as to
make the delivery a negotiation. (Sec. 31 of Sales Act
and Sec.39 of Warehouse Receipts Act.) The idea is differently expressed in the Bills of Lading Act and a reader
is apt to miss the point. It says in Sec. 30: "A bill may
be transferred by the holder by delivery, accompanied with
an agreement express or implied, to transfer the title to
the bill or to the goods represented thereby." It is not
made clear that this applies only to bills not in euch form
as to make the transaction a negotiation. The act suggests the possible intent to transfer title to the bill while
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retaining title to the goods and vice 'versa, but makes the
delivery a transfer of the bill in either case. The simpler
provision of the other acts is adequate and it is a pity that
they are not all uniform. All the acts provide that the
indorsement of a straight document is of no effect. It is
entirely out of place and meaningless.
Effect of Negotiation and Transfer Compared
"The essence of a negotiable contract, as distinguished
from a non-negotiable one, is that a holder in due course of
a negotiable contract acquires himself a direct right on the
instrument, which may be better than the rights of the
original holder, and will not be subject to any personal or
equitable defences affecting parties who have preceded
him." (Williston's Lectures on Commercial Law, p. 133.)
Sec. 33 of the Sales Act, Sec. 41 of the Warehouse Receipts Act and Sec. 32 of the Bills of Lading Act all provide that one to whom a document has been negotiated acquires the direct obligation of the bailee to hold possession
of the goods for him as fully as if such ballee had contracted directly with him.
The following sections, (34, 42
and 33 of said acts), define the effect of transfer of a
straight document. We find that by notifying the bailee
of the transfer, the transferee acquires the same direct obligation of the bailee and further we find that after such
notice the transferee is protected against the levy of an
attachment or execution upon the goods by a creditor of
the transferor and also against a subsequent sale of the
goods by the transferor. This considerably limits the doctrine that a straight document does not represent the goods,
for while the bailee may deliver the goods without the surrender of such a document, a purchaser of the goods represented by such a document must get the d6cument or inquire of the bailee whether notice has been given of a prior
sale of the goods, and if not, then give prompt notice of
the sale to himself. Of course transfer is as effective as
negotiation to transfer title to the goods, as between the immediate parties to the transaction. In addition to the fore-
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going provisions, the Bills of Lading Act contains a section
not in the Sales Act or the Warehouse Receipts Act. It
provides that a transferee, in order to acquire the rights
that follow notice to the carrier of the transfer, must give
the notice "to an officer or agent of the carrier, the actual
or apparent scope of whose duties includes action upon
such a notification ;" and "no notification shall be effective
until the officer or agent to whom it is given has had time
with the exercise of reasonable diligence to communicate
with the agent or agents having actual possession or control of the goods."
This provision is obviously unnecessary in the case of Warehouse Receipts but it must be read
into the Sales Act when bills of lading are involved. It is
apparent that proper notice to the bailee is vital to the security of a purchaser of goods represented by a straight
document.
At common law, as between successive bona
fide purchasers of goods in the hands of a bailee, the first
purchaser had the better right to the goods. The case of
successive sales of goods represented by a negotiable document is covered by Sec. 25 of the Sales Act, Sec. 4 of the
Stock Transfer Act, Sec. 48 of the Warehouse Receipts Act
and Sec. 39 of the Bills of Lading Act. In such a case it
is the delivery of the document that is vital. If the first
purchaser omits to get the document, a later buyer who gets
the document, properly indorsed, takes a good title.
The
Sales Act adopts the same rule when a first buyer permits
the seller to continue in possession of the goods themselves.
The later Pennsylvania cases relaxed this rule in cases in
which there was a satisfactory explanation of the failure to
take possession and no fraudulent intent.
See Williston
on Sales, p. 654. The Pennsylvania cases gave as full protection to creditors of the vendor retaining possession as
was given to purchasers. Sec. 25 of the Sales Act gives full
protection to purchasers, while See. 26 requires that the retention be fraudulent under the local law.
No uniform
rule is attempted when the validity of the sale is questioned
by creditors. The Sales Act applies only when the original
transaction was a sale but protects subsequent pledges as
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well as subsequent buyers. The Warehouse Receipts Act and
the Bills of Lading Act apply the same rule whether the
original or later transaction be a sale, pledge or a mort-

gage. The word "purchaser" is defined in all the acts as
including mortgagee and pledgee but Sec. 25 of the Sales
Act does not contain the word purchase or purchaser. It
is, however, to be read in the light of the other acts and
not as limiting them. The acts contain no sections relating
to the effect of retention of a -straight document after a
sale, mortgage or pledge of the bailed goods. But as delivery and notice are the essentials of an effective transfer
as against third parties, it would seem that a second bona
fide purchaser of a straight document would get a good
title, if he got the document and gave the first notice to the
bailee. It is a pity the acts are not explicit on this point.
(To be Continued).
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MOOT COURT
MARTIN v. EDWARDS
Statutory Rape--Civil Liability For-Effect of Plaintiff's ConsentAct of May 19, 1887, P. L. 128
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, who was 18 years old, had intercourse with the
plaintiff, a girl 15 years old, of good repute, with her consent. This
is a civil action for damages sustained.
O'Hare, for the plaintiff.
Tureck, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RAUB, J. The first proposition is, that a female under the
age of 16 years is incapable of consenting to an act of carnal knowledge, or any assault with intent to commit the act. We hold this
to be the law of the case.
The Act of May 19, 1887, P. L. 128 says, "If any person shall
have carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will
or who being of the age of 16 years and upward shall unlawfully
and carnally know and abuse any woman child under 16 years of
age with or without her consent, such person shall be adjudged
guilty of felonious rape, and on conviction be sentenced to pay a
fine, not exceeding $1000, and to undergo imprisonment, etc.." It
seems to have been the rule at all times of the common law,
True, it is
that under ten years, she could not legally consent.
an arbitrary rule, the intelligence of the child depending much upon
climate, modes of life, social customs and education. All will admit
the necessity of some such rule. Some age must be fixed upon, below which no child would be deemed capable of giving that intelligent consent which would in the eyes of just people, be any excuse
or even mitigation of an act of carnal knowledge.
We claim therefore, that the law has determined that a female
child under the age denominated is incapable of assenting. It is as
though she had no mind upon the subject; no volition or sufficient
discretion to give her consent to an act which is palpably wrong,
both in morals and in law. In other words, the law makes it just
as much of a wrong against a female infant to violate her person
as a forcible ravishment of an adult female. It is a legal, as well
as a moral wrong, and we can discover no reason why the perpetrator of the act should not be required to respond in damages as
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fully in one case as in the other. The language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous."It is obviously based upon the principle that
consent or non-resistance on the part of a girl of tender years is
not to be understood in the same way as in the case of like acts committed upon a woman of more mature years." Dean v. Raplee, 145
N. Y. 319. It clearly eliminates the elements of consent and resistance from the case of an assault upon the class of females therein
described. Its manifest purpose is to throw a protecting mantle
about the female children of this State under a certain age, which
the hand of the libertine may not withdraw except at his peril.
To prove that the female consented will not mollify the statute. Neither should it avail as a defense to a civil action for damages for an assault upon her committed in such a manner and under
such circumstances as to constitute rape as defined by the statute.
Under these conditions, while a girl may give her formal and apparent consent, yet in law she gives none. "The reason is that from
her tender years, she is held in law to be incapable of giving a valid
consent to such acts and the law conclusively presumes that she did
not consent." 3 Greenleaf Ev., art. 211.
The next question that arises is whether the defendant can be
held liable in a civil action to the injured person for damages where
he
violated
her person
in
case
she
is
under
the
age of 16 years and made no resistance to the assault.
Rape of a female gave her a cause of atcion at common
law. Consent of course defeated the charge of rape, where the
party was capable of giving consent. Defendant contends that the
plaintiff cannot maintain an action, following the maxim, "volenti
non fit injuria." It is a general rule of law that no one can maintain
an action for damages for a wrong where he has consented to the
act which occasioned his loss; and this principle -has often been applied under states of facts showing that, though the defendant was
in the wrong, the plaintiff's negligence or consent had contributed
to produce the damage complained of.
Nearly all the cases and
text-books seem to uphold the doctrine, but most of the cases are for
assaults upon adults. Under statute the maxim quoted above does
not affect an infant, as the law conclusively says she can give no
consent.
The statute was manifestly designed to increase, not to diminish, the protection of children of that tender age and to throw
around them additional safe-guards. We are not disposed to defeat the object of the statute by so construing it as to invite evilly
disposed persons to select as their victims persons who are least
able to protect themselves, and to whom the consequences are likely
to be more serious, by allowing a non-intelligent consent to be a
bar to a civil action,

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The civil liability has not been defined or its elements determined, but the rule has been very early established among the several states, "that a child under statutory age has no legal capacity
to give consent to carnal knowledge, and her consent does therefore
not waive the assault in an action for damages." People v. Duncan McDonald, 9 Mich. 149. That a civil action to recover damages
for an assault may be maintained by or in behalf of a female under
the age of 16 years, where the assault upon her is committed in
such a manner and under such circumstances as to constitute statutory rape, is held in Preboth v. Haveron, 139 Pac. 673.
To speak of an assault with her consent, with intent to carnally know and abuse her without her consent seems to involve a
contradiction in terms, and yet that seems to be defendant's contention.
But when it is once considered that the intention of the law
is to declare that a young girl shall be deemed incapable of consenting to such an act to her injury, and that evidence of any consent
by her shall be incompetent in defense in an action therefor, and
that, although she gives a formal and apparent consent, yet in law
as in reality, she gives none and cannot take in the meaning of what
is done, all legal difficulty disappears and the conclusion may properly be reached that the assault is without her consent and against
-her will. So that the measure of damages is the same for the offense against a child as against an adult. It will thus be seen that
the legislature has defined carnal knowledge of a female under age
cf 16 years as rape, whether the action be civil or criminal. Our
statute would scarcely be more explicit if it declared in express
terms that an assault upon a female child, under 16 years of age,
to carnally know, would be such an injury that the child could recover substantial damages, even though the child consented.
A third question may arise and it may be stated thus--May a
person consent to an illegal act? A female cannot consent in contemplation of law, to abortion, incest, adultery, etc., and it may be
said that no one can consent to an act endangering public morals.
No one will dispute that plaintiff's act was both immoral and
illegal and her consent furnishes no excuse, either civilly or criminally.
"But whatever we may think of the policy of a statute that
treats a girl 15 years old, however mature she may be in -body end
mind, as if she were incapable of committing the crime of fornication, and subjects a male of mature age with whom she joins in sexual intercourse to a possibility of a greater punishment than second
degree murder, the legislature is ordinarily the judge of the expediency of creating new crimes and of prescribing penalties, whether
light or severe, for prohibited acts. We cannot say that the punishment prescribed for this offense, when the girl is nearly 16
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years of age and voluntarily participates in it, is beyond the constituted power of the legislature to inflict." Commonwealth v.
Daniel F. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66.
Looking at the question in this light, it is easy to comprehend
the legal and logical conclusion that the plantiff should recover
substantial damages for the injuries sustained and we therefore
find for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
According to the common law, a female upon whom a rape is
cnmmitted may maintain an action against the violator of her person to recover damages for the injuries sustained. 33 Cyc. 1521.
An action can likewise be maintained by a female upon whom an
assault with intent to commit rape has been committed. 33 Cyc.
1521. It is held, however, that in such actions the maxim "volenti
non fit inuria" applies and that therefore the plaintiff cannot recover if she consented. Robinson v. Musser, 78 Mo. 173. Dean v.
Raplee, 145 N. Y. 319.
The plaintiff contends that the act of 1887, defining the crime
of rape, has rendered females under the age of sixteen incapabl4
of consenting and that this incapacity may be asserted and relied
upon in civil actions in which the female is the plaintiff as well as
in criminal prosecutions. The contention of the plaintiff finds support in a number of recent cases. Preboth v. Haveron, (Okla.) 139
Pac. 973; Hough v. Iderhoff (Ore.) 139 Pac. 931. See also Dean v.
IRaplee, 145 N. Y. 326.
The proposition that statutes, similar to the act of 1887, defining the crime of rape, render consent legally impossible is at
least questionable.
"It is less fictitious and equally in harmony
vwith the wording of the statutes to say that consent is made immaterial to criminal liability." 28 Harvard Law Review 101.
Such an interpretation of these statutes is justified by authority.
In S. v. Learned, 73 Ran. 328 the court, construing the Kansas statute said, "This does not disqualify the female under eighteen from
consenting, but provides, in effect, that her consent is no defense;
that notwithstanding her consent the act on the part of the man
constitutes the crime of rape." And in Ex parte Nesson (S. D.) 125
N. W. 124, it is said, "It is therefore clear that the so-called age of
consent statutes do not in any manner attempt by law to fix an
age under which a female is mentally incapable of consent." "What
the legislature did say was virtually this. 'The man shall be guilty
of rape where the female is under the age of eighteen years
whether the act of intercourse is with her consent or not.' "
This interpretation has been given to the statutes though the
effect of so interpreting them was to impose civil or criminal re-
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sponsibility upon the female. Glenn v. Hollopeter, (Wash.) 21 L. R.
A. N. S. 847; Ex parte Nesson (S. D.) 27 L. R. A. N. S. 872.
The authoTities therefore, are neither harmonious nor conclusive,
and we are not compelled by them to affirm the decision of the
learned court below. But we do affirm it. In holding that the consent of either participant in a mutual combat is no defense to an
action by the other, the courts have yielded to the criminal law principle that consent does not excuse an act which tends to a breach
of the peace or severe bodily harm. A decision in this case to the
effect the consent of the plaintiff has been rendered immaterial by
a criminal statute will not be an anomaly.
Judgment affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v. HAYNES
Constitutional Law-Act Prescribing Minimum Salary For Teachers
-Common School System-Police Power
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statute made it a criminal offense for any school director,
or other officer whose duty it was to employ teachers, to contract
with such teachers for any salary below $600 a year. Haynes, a
director, contracted with Scott, to serve as teacher for $500 a year.
Haynes denies the constitutionality of the act.
This is an indictment for violating the statute.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SAVIGE, J. Justice Brewer, in Frisbie v. U. S., 15 Supreme Ct.
Reporter 586, says concerning -the unconstitutionality of a statute
to regulate the price of labor, "While it may be conceded that genrally speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that
of the liberty of contract, yet such liberty is not absolute and universal. It is within the undoubted powers of government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals
from some contracts." This is a broad and general statement and
will bear examination. In the fourteenth amendment to the United
States constitution, rights and liberties, freedom to acquire, possess,
and protect property, and to enjoy the protection of the law, as
well as that the state shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the same terms shall
not belong to all citizens, are guaranteed. This has been made a
defense in a great mass of cases involving the constitutionality of
police power exercised by the state legislatures and by the municipal authorities.
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The constitution declares that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law, yet none of the cases making
this a defense has undertaken to explain just what is meant by due
process of law.
Can it mean that there must be a decree of court
requiring the citizen to pay over a certain amount? It cannot be,
for thousands of dollars are paid over in the various cities, boroughs, and towns in taxes yearly. The amount paid pro rata by
the citizens is fixed by municipal authorities, which shows that it
need not be by specific acts of the legislature. We are in the dark
about the exact meaning of this phrase.
The question of constitutionality of a statute regulating the
salaries of school teachers must be argued upon practically the
same ground as the question which has been subject to much litigation, the question of the constitutionality of statutes making a
minimum wage law, especially minimum wage laws for laborers employed on public works. The legislature went a long way when
it undertook to regulate the number of hours per day private corporations could allow their employees to work. It is obvious that
the state could more easily presume to make regulations over those
under it, i. e., public officers, or those engaged in public works.
However, a statute regulating the number of hours per day a man
shall work, and a statute regulating his compensation, are vitally
different in their effect on the employer and the employee.
We find that the English Parliament enacted statutes of labor
of Henry VI. and Edward IV. fixing a maximum rate of wages, demanding that a man must work for the first employer demanding
his services, and that he must remain and work in his own country.
This proved odious and oppressive as it took away all
personal liberty, and was soon repealed.
In the Supreme
Court of Kansas it was contended that a minimum wage law made
undue restriction and that there were the same objections to it as
to the maximum wage law, but the court ruled otherwise. Re Dalton, 61 Kansas 257.
The Assembly of New York has enacted various acts on minimum wages.
In 1897 they made a labor statute which was tried,
but the courts found it unconstitutional. The judge in The People
of State of New York ex. rel. Ralph J. Treat, Respondent v. Bird
S. Coler, as Comptroller of City of New York, Appellant, 166 N. Y.
144, said, "The legislature cannot bind a municipal government hand
and foot. To do so would make the local government a sham and
delusion. It was once a political maxim that that government governs best that governs least." In 1906 the Assembly put through
practically the same bill, attaching some amendinents, and when
put to the test it was held valid. Clark v. State of New York, 142
N. Y. 148; New York ex. rel. Contracting Co. v. Metz, 193 N. Y.
148; People v. Construction Co., 175 N. Y. 84.
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In Ryan v. New York, 177 N. Y. 271, in discussing the power of
the legislature to prescribe a minimum wage for employees of a
municipality, it is said. "All these agencies and employers of the
municipality are doing the work of the state, which is the sovereign
and master." That is to say, that local officers, e. g., constables,
school directors, and the like, derive all their powers from the
state. They have no rights except those vested in them by the
legislature, and they tre responsible to the legislature for the way
they perform their duties.
There is another view, that a local officer is not an agent of
the state, but of the locality. The former view is supported by the
doctrine that the state is divided into counties and municipalities to
aid in the government of the people by the state, and consequently
all public officers must look to the state as the source. The latter view is that the local public officers are liable to the municipality which elects and supports them, and that the legislature has no
right to interfere with his liberty or to abridge his freedom in
performing his duties, he being liable to the municipality.
The
two views do not seem to be able to be reconciled.
A statute undertaking to fix the minimum rate to be paid to a
particular class employed upon any public work without regard to
the actual value of such labor, or the rate paid by other persons,
natural or artificial, for the same kind of labor in the same vicinity, is held unconstitutional in Street v. Varney Electrical Supply
Co., 160 Ind. 338, s. c., 61 L. R. A. N. S. 154.
The Supreme
court of the State of Washington declares a minimum wage law
unconstitutional in C. E. Mallette, App't. v. City of Spokane, Res.,
51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 686.
In deciding the case of William H. Arnett v. State, 80 N. W.
153, it is held that a school director is a public officer. His office
is provided for by statute subject to limitations and qualifications
made in connection therewith.
The manipulation of the public
schools is a function of the state; the instruction of the youth of the
land is the interest of the state. It seems proper that the state
should assume this responsibility.
The court thought that the
state could set the maximum and minimum limits of teachers' salaries.
Bopp v. Clark, 147 N. W. 172, also found in 52 L. R. A. (N. S.),
493, an Iowa case, is in point with the case at bar. In that case it was
held, and all the Justices concurred, that it is within the power of
the legislature to enact and enforce minimum wages for teachers.
In that case the defense was the denial of the constitutionality of
the statute. The school director relied on the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution and similar sections of the
state constitution, the same as relied on by the counsel for the de-
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fendant in the present case. The court seemed to think that those
sections had no relevancy nor special application to the case, and
that they were not violated by the statute in question. School directors have no powers beyond those vested by the state legislature.
Minimum wage laws for laborers prevent competition, and if exercised too freely would prevent competition when competition is needed. If men are employed to carry bricks the competency of the labor
need not be questioned; it is to the best interest of the public,
in general that the one who shall carry them the cheapest should
have the job, no matter whether he be an illiterate or a well educated man. For a great deal of the work done competition is necessary, but when the work to be performed is such as requires skill
and intelligence the poorly equipped should not be permitted to displace the well equipped, for the latter will do the work in a more
satisfactory manner and to the better interest to the public in general. It is manifest that it is the purpose of the law to raise the
standard of the teaching force, and by making a minimum wage
they have put a bar to competition so that the poorly qualified and
less competent -rank of teachers cannot crowd out the better. Maximum wage laws for the different grade districts would be unwise,
for it is felt that a school board should be permitted to advance the
compensation of its teachers so that it may secure the best qualified. It would be greatly to the detriment of public interest if the
lowest bidders were permitted to secure employment to the prejudice of the more successful teachers. While it is the duty of the
court to show that the statute is in the legislative domain, and
z.ot to elaborate on the wisdom of the statute, yet it may be said
that all such laws are more or less tentative and must be revised as
aefects appear, and the court is the place where defects are bound
to appear. Public policy is a very strong factor.
In Pennsylvania there has been a minimum wage law for teachers for a number of years. It is a strong defense to the statute
that so far as we have been able to learn the constitutionality of
it has never been questioned. It is made a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania to hire a teacher for less than a certain salary, depending
on the nature of the certificate under which the teacher is serving.
A great many cases have been cited on behalf of the plaintiff
and the defendant in this case, and many others have been examined
from a large number of States, the weight of which is to the
effect that the legislature has powers to impose burdens upon municipalities, and to a large extent control their local administration
and property; and as in the present case, may abridge the right of
a local public officer to contract as public policy may demand.
We are of opinion that no constitutional provision whatsoever
is violated by the enactment of this law; and that any law that is
made which is not in derogation of the constitution is enforceable,
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We
and automatically repeals any existing law on the subject.
feel that the great weight of authority is with the Commonwealth
and they are entitled to the judgment of this court .
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The common school system is the creature of legislation. The
legislature in establishing it, has sought to promote the education
of the youth of the State. Teachers !are necessary for this work,
and, in a general way, the competency of teachers may be rated by
the salaries which they insist on getting. A school district which
offers low salaries may expect to obtain less able and efficient
teachers than one which is more liberal in its compensation of those
who teach.
We can realize no constitutional objection to the adoption of
the method of securing a minimum salary in order to obtain capaIble teachers.
The legislature has imposed on the directors the duty of fixing the salaries, and it has chosen to criminalize the making of
contracts which stipulate for less than the sum of $600 per year.
We see no objection to the regulation of the conduct of directors in
this respect, and to the compelling of obedience to the regulation,
by subjecting the disobedient director to punishment. The case of
Bopp v. Clark, 147 N. W. (Iowa), 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, reaches
this conclusion. We think properly.
Affirmed.

HIRONS v. DENNY
Contract-Specific

Performance-Offer and Acceptance-OptionRule Against Perpetuities
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Denny in 1895 executed in writing an agreement that at any
time Hirons might become the purchaser of a certain tract of land
belonging to Denny, and containing 50 acres, on his binding himself to pay $5000 therefor.
In 1914 Hirons tendered the deed to
Denny for the land for execution, and also $5000 in money, or as
Denny chose, a bond for $5000 with interest, payable three months
after date. Denny refused to execute the deed. This is a bill for
specific performance.
MeKone, for the plaintiff.
Griffith, for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
CLASTER, J. When an option is given to accept an offer
within 60 days, and there is no consideration for the option, the
party making the offer may revoke it at any time before acceptance.
Bosshardt & Wilson Co. v. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. 109;
Boston & Maine R. R. v. Bartlett, 57 lass. 224. In the present
case there was no consideration and the agreement thereby became
an offer, which was revocable at any time before acceptance. The
optionor may revoke by selling to some one else and the record will
be notice to the optionee. If the optionee has notice that the optionor has done some act inconsistent with the continuance of the
offer, it may amount to a withdrawal of the offer. Elliott on Contracts, Vol. 1, p. 232, n. 43 and cases thereunder.
Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, presents a somewhat similar case.
This was a bill in equity to remove a cloud upon title. It alleged
that the plaintiffs were owners of certain lands; that their predecessors in title had granted the coal underlying such land by a deed
containing a covenant that in case the grantee, his heirs or assigns,
"should at any future time whatsoever desire to purchase any of the
said land in fee simple, then the parties of the first part for them.
-elves, their heirs and assigns, hereby covenant and agree to sell the
same to the said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, at a price not exceeding $100 an acre." It was alleged that
the defendants were the successors in title of the grantees of such
deed.
The plaintiff prayed that his covenant be cancelled.
The
court held that this was but an option to purchase, which under its
terms could be exercised at any time in the future, and was void,
as being in violation of the rule against perpetuities, and the relief prayed for was granted.
"The law allows the vesting of an estate or interest, or rte
power of alienation, to be postponed for a period of lives in being,
and 21 years and nine months thereafter; and all restraints upon
the vesting that may suspend it beyond that period are treated as
perpetual restraints, and therefore are void, and consequently the
estates or interests dependent upon them are void, and nothing is
denounced by the law as a perpetuity that does not transgress
this rule." Phila. v. Girard, 45 Pa. 9; Johnston's Est., 185 Pa. 179;
Gerber's Est., 196 Pa. 366. "Every executory estate which might,
iL any event, transgress this limit, will from it's commencement be
absolutely void." Coggin's App., 124 Pa. 10. "When lives in being
cannot be taken as a measure, the perpetuity is 21 years." John-ston's Est., supra. This is virtually the rule against perpetuities.
On pages 363 and 364 of Barton v. Thaw, supra, the court bases

60

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

its reasoning for the adoption of the rule against perpetuities solely on the public policy doctrine. If estates are allowed to be contmngent in violation of the rule, then estates may be made inalienable at the caprice of the optionee or his heirs and assigns. It
will also be seen in Windsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 364, that
Knowlton, J., uses the same reasoning as the foundation for the
rule. The owner or optionor in the case of Barton v. Thaw, of the
vested interest, parts with his right to sell the land, except to the
second party, for an unlimited period, and therefore, comes within
the rule. London & South Western R. R. -Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D.
Mr. Jabez Fox,
562; Gray on Rule against Perpetuities, p. 198.
in 6 Harvard Law Review, 195, has reviewed cases from the year
1618 to the year 1853, and takes the ground that it is clearly the
idea of the judges that the rule was aimed at preventing inalienability.
In the case of Barton v. Thaw, the right to call for a conveyance of the land is an equitable interest, or equitable estate. The
optionor's estate or interest is taken away from him without his
consent, merely by the optionee's giving notice and paying the purAnd the right to take it away being
chase money at any time.
vested in another, the covenant giving the option must give that
other an interest in the land. It, therefore, is an interest, which
so far as remoteness is concerned, comes within the rule.
Judge Miller, in Starcher v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, L, R. A.
(N. S.) 913, says, "Where the lessor is not restrained from his right
of alienation, and he nevertheless alienates, subject to a lease, with
a perpetual right of renewal, then the rule against perpetuities
does not apply." The facts of the case at bar, though different
from the case of Barton v. Thaw, supra., present even a stronger
Although the optionee Hirons
case than Starcher v. Duty, supra.
had a right to exercise his option at any time, nevertheless, Denny
had the right, at any time, to revoke his offer by an alienation of
the land. The optionor, Denny, had the right to alienate to anyone
be deemed best or saw fit. Windsor v. Mills, supra holds, "that
in order to take the case out of the operation of the rule, the estate
must be alienable by those having vested interests." Therefore, in
accordance with the rule thus laid down, since Denny had the vested
interest and had the right of alienation, the case at bar is outside the
operation of the rule.
Had Hirons accepted the offer within a reasonable time, then
there would have been MUTUALITY OF REMEDIES, and a Court
of Equity would have granted specific performance of the written
contract. Newell's Appeal, 100 Pa. 513; Hall v. Center, 40 Cal. 03;
Ilawes v. Favor, 161 Ill. 440. We therefore see no reason in the
argument of the plaintiff in this case when he states, "there is no
mutuality of remedies."
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In Equity, the time of performance ought to be regarded as
immaterial where there has been no MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THE CONTRACT Haverstick v.
Erie Gas Co., 29 Pa. 255; Sylvester v. Born, 132 Pa. 467. But, in
the above cases the lapse of time was much less than in the case
at bar, one being for 3 years and the other only 3 days. Therefore,
it appears from these cases, that tine is not material provided there
is no material change in the circumstances.
Although the facts in the case at bar do not suggest any increase in value or change in the eircumstances affecting the contract, nevertheless, ought we not to infer that there was some material change? Counsel for the d-fendant ably contends. "Taking
into consideration the industrial and educational advancement of
our commonwealth along all lines, it is scarcely conceivable that the
price of land should remain static." The very fact that the plain.
tiff desires a conveyance of the premises, and the defendant refuses
to convey, creates an inference or presumption that there was some
change or improvement. The very fact that the plaintiff allowed
the contract to run, unaccepted, for so long a period, shows that he
was a mere speculator, who had no intention whatsoever of accepting the contract unless there was a change in his favor.
The elemental law of contracts in respect to offers is applicable here. WHERE NO TIME LIMIT IS FIXED BY THE PARTIES,
THE ACCEPTANCE THEREOF MUST BE MADE WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME, or the offer lapses. There being no consideration for the offer, we cannot consider the offer as one continuing ad infinitum. Girard College Pass. R. R. Co. v. 13th St.
Etc. Rwy., 7 Phila. 620; Keck v. McKinley, 98 Pa. 616. Therefore,
in view of the above reasoning and authorities cited, we are of the
opinion that 20 years was an unreasonable time to wait, and refuse the bill for specific performance. Bill dismissed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Two objections are made to the specific performance of the
so-called contract, in favor of the vendee or optionee. The writing
of 1895 was not a contract by Denny to -sell, and by Hirons to buy
the iand. Hirons did not agree to do anything. He was as free,
after the execution of the writing, as before. At most he simply
acquired a right which he did not have before, the right, viz, on the
tender of $5,000 or of a bond therefor, to compel a conveyance of
the land. He did not oblige himself to deliver either money or bond.
The writing then is merely an offer to sell the land for $5,000
at -any time at which Hirons should desire to buy. No consideration was'paid for the offer. It could be retracted at any time, before acceptance. But it was not retracted before acceptance.
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Although the offer was to convey at any time, it did not remain
open until the expiration of any time. A gratuitous offer to convey 10, 15, 20 years hence lapses before the passing of 10, 15, or 20
years. It remains open for a reasonable time. If it has not been
withdrawn it may be accepted within a reasonable time. It does not
remain open beyond, and an attempted acceptance beyond, would be
an abortive attempt to accept what is no longer in existence, viz, a
preterit, dead, offer. When nineteen years after the making of the
offer Hirons tried to accept it, there was nothing to accept. No contract arose.
Let us suppose however, that the offer had not lapsed when,
in 1914, an effort was made to accept it. If the offer of an option
had been accepted shortly after it was offered for a consideration,
and had therefore been enforceable, generally, the interest created
by it in Hirons would have been so far contingent that it would
have been subject to the rule against perpetuities. Denny would have
held the land in fee subject to the risk of divestiture, should Hirons
decide to purchase.
Hirons would have had a right to purchase,
that is, to acquire the fee, if he should choose to pay $5,000, or
give a bond for that sum. He would have had a fee contingent on
the condition precedent that he tendered the payment, and made
demand for a conveyance.
A contingent future estate may be made no less by contract
than by a devise or a conveyance. Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348.
In order to be valid, it must be so contrived that the event on which
the estate is suspended shall occur in 21 years, or, a life or lives in
-being being designated, within those lives in being or within them
plus 21 years. Here, no lives are selected, nor is the election to take
so limited that it must be made in 21 years. The rule is therefore
violated.
That the election to take has actually occurred within 21 years,
does not save the limitation from sterility. It must be ordained to
occur, if at all, by the contract, devise, etc., within 21 years.
Had then a consideration been paid for the option, or had it
been accepted within a reasonable time, since it contemplated a
vesting by decision to purchase, which might not occur within 21
years, it would be void.
But a fortiori is a gratuitous offer, not accepted in a reasonable
time, void, for the purpose of creating a right to an estate which
might be contingent for more than twenty-one years.
It is unnecessary that we cite authorities in support of the conclusion thus reached.
Enough of them (in particular Barton v.
Thaw, supra) are cited in the excellent opinion of the learned court
below.
The bill for specific performance has been rightly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

